Charles C. Rehn, an Individual; And That Certain Real Property Located at 4118 Saddleback Road, Park City, Utah Plaintiffs/ Appellants/Crossappellees, v. Steves. Christensen, an Individual; Steves. Christensen, p.c., a Utah Professional Corporation; Henroid, Nielsen, & Christensen, a Utah General Partnership; Christensen, Corbett & Pankratz, PLLC, a Utah Professional Limited Liability Company; Hirschi Christensen,pLLC,a Utah Professional Limited Liability Company; And All Unknown Persons Who Claim Any Interest in the Subject Matter of the Action. Defendants/ Appellees/ Crossappellants. by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) 
2016 
Charles C. Rehn, an Individual; And That Certain Real Property 
Located at 4118 Saddleback Road, Park City, Utah Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants/Crossappellees, v. Steves. Christensen, an Individual; 
Steves. Christensen, p.c., a Utah Professional Corporation; 
Henroid, Nielsen, & Christensen, a Utah General Partnership; 
Christensen, Corbett & Pankratz, PLLC, a Utah Professional 
Limited Liability Company; Hirschi Christensen,pLLC,a Utah 
Professional Limited Liability Company; And All Unknown Persons 
Who Claim Any Interest in the Subject Matter of the Action. 
Defendants/ Appellees/ Crossappellants. 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. 
Recommended Citation 
Reply Brief, Rehn v Christensen, No. 20150119 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2016). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3706 
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. 
Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/
policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with questions or feedback. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHARLES C. REHN, an individual; and 
that certain real property located at 4118 
SADDLEBACK ROAD, PARK CITY, 
UTAH, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants/ Cross-
Appellees, 
STEVES. CHRISTENSEN, an 
individual; STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN, 
P.C., a Utah professional corporation; 
HENRIOD, NIELSEN, & 
CHRISTENSEN, a Utah general 
partnership; CHRISTENSEN, 
CORBETT & PANKRATZ, PLLC, a 
Utah professional limited liability company; 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC, a 
Utah professional limited liability company; 
and ALL UNKNOWN PERSONS WHO 
CLAIM ANY INTEREST IN THE 
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE 
ACTION, 
Defendants/ Appellees/ Cross-
Appellants. 
REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT 
Appellate Case No. 20150119-CA 
District Court Case No. 130500115 
Oral Argument Requested 
Appeal from Final Judgment, Rulings, and Orders of the Third Judicial District Court of 
Utah, Summit County, Utah, the Honorable Ryan M. Harris, Presiding 
Joseph E. Wrona 
Jared C. Bowman 
WRONA GoRDON & DUBOIS, P.C. 
17 45 Sidewinder Drive 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Telephone: ( 435) 649-2525 
·Email: wrona@wgdlawfirm.com 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Clinton R. Brimhall (U.S.B. 15100) 
Jeremy R. Miller (U.S.B. 12168) 
CHRISTENSEN LAW 
340 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 303-5800 
Email: crb@ccplawyers.com 
Email: jrm@ccplawyers.com 
Attorneys for Appellees 
FILED 
lJTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAY 1 1 2016 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHARLES C. REHN, an individual; and 
that certain real property located at 4118 
SADDLEBACK ROAD, PARK CI1Y, 
UTAH, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants/Cross-
Appellees, 
STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN, an 
individual; STEVES. CHRISTENSEN, 
P.C., a Utah professional corporation; 
HENRIOD, NIELSEN, & 
CHRISTENSEN, a Utah general 
partnership; CHRISTENSEN, 
CORBETT & PANKRATZ, PLLC, a 
Utah professional limited liability company; 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC, a 
Utah professional limited liability company; 
and ALL UNKNOWN PERSONS WHO 
CLAIM ANY INTEREST IN THE 
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE 
ACTION, 
Defendants/ Appellees/Cross-
Appellants. 
REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT 
Appellate Case No. 20150119-CA 
District Court Case No. 130500115 
Oral Argument Requested 
Appeal from Final Judgment, Rulings, and Orders of the Third Judicial District Court of 
Utah, Summit County, Utah, the Honorable Ryan M. Harris, Presiding 
Joseph E. Wrona 
Jared C. Bowman 
WRONA GORDON & DUBOIS, P.C. 
17 45 Sidewinder Drive 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Telephone: (435) 649-2525 
Email: wrona@wgdlawfirm.com 
Attornrys far Appellant 
Clinton R. Brimhall (U.S.B. 15100) 
Jeremy R. :tviiller (U.S.B. 12168) 
CHRISTENSEN LAW 
340 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 303-5800 
Email: crb@ccplawyers.com 
Email: jrm@ccplawyers.com 
Attorneys far Appellees 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................................. i 
TABLE OF AUTHORJTIES .......................................................................................................... iii 
IN1RODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 1 
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................... 1 
I. REHN HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT APPELLEES' KNEW 
THEIR CLAIM THAT A LIEN EXISTED WAS FALSE ......................................... 1 
IL NOTWITHSTANDING REHN'S ARGU]\ffiNTS, THE SU1\11vIA.R.Y 
JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLEES WAS IMPROPER. ...................................... 3 
A. Appellees held an attorney's lien .................................................................................... 4 
1. Obtaining ownership of property after representation ends does not shield 
it from an attorney's lien if it was the subject of or connected with the 
representation .................................................................................................................... 4 
2. The Property was the marital property and was connected to Christensen's 
representation of Rehn .................................................................................................... 4 
3. Contrary to Rehn's argument, Bay Harbor Farm, LC v. Sumsion is 
instructive. Rehn's proposed alternate, CFD Payson, LLC v. Christensen is 
inapposite ........................................................................................................................... 5 
4. An attorney's lien exists independent of the mistakes in the document 
giVUJ.g notice of the lien .................................................................................................... 8 
5. Concluding that an attorney's lien exists regardless of errors in the notice 
thereof does not render the notice portions of the attorney's lien statute 
meaningless ........................................................................................................................ 9 
C. Rehn' s argument that there is no harmful error in the district court's 
summary judgrrient ruling is incorrect ......................................................................... 12 
III. NO AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE (OR LACK OF OPPOSING 
EVIDENCE) CAN JUSTIFY THE A WARD OF DAMAGES THAT ARE 
PER SE INELIGIBLE FOR AWARD ......................................................................... 12 
IV. DESPITE REHN'S ASSERTIONS TO THE CONTRARY, APPELLEES 
HAVE PHRASED ISSUES APPROPRIATELY AND INVOKED 
CORRECT STANDARDS OF REVIEW .................................................................... 14 
1 
~J 
~I Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
V. REHN'S BRIEF MISCHARACTERIZES FACTS. IT ALSO 
MISCHARACTERIZES APPELLEES' PRESENTATION OF THE 
FACTS ................................................................................................................................. 18 
A. The Property was, indeed, the marital home, and Rehn consulted 
Christensen in regard thereto ........................................................................................ 18 
B. Appellees held a contractual lien .................................................................................. 19 
C. The difference between Appellees' version of the facts and Rehn' s version 
of the facts is caused by differing perspectives and interpretations ........................ 20 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................ 22 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUlvffiNT ....................................................................................... 23 
CERTIFICATE OF COlvfPLIANCE WITH RULE 24(G)(S)(D) ........................................... 24 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ...................................................................................................... 24 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wo!fMountain Resorts, LC., 2013 UT 24 ........................................................... 18 
Bqy Harbor Farm, LC. v. Sumsion, 2014 UT App 133, 329 P.3d 46 ................................... i, 5, 6, 7 
CFD Pqyson, LLC v. Christensen, 2015 UT App 251, 361 P.3d 145 ....................................... ~ 5, 7 
Colquhoun v. Webber, 684 A.2d 405 (tvfe. 1996) ............................................................................... 18 
Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 23 .................................................................................................................. 13 
Dillon v. S. Mgmt. Corp. Retirement Trust, 2014 UT 14, 326 P.3d 656 ............................. 1, 3, 14, 16 
First Sec. Bank v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989) ...................................................... 3 
First Se,: Mtg. Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919 (Utah 1981) ................................................................... 8 
Nejf v. Neff, 2011 UT 6,247 P.3d 380 ............................................................................................. 18 
Orvis v.Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 177 P.3d 60 ......................................................................................... 21 
State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1941) .................................................................................... 13 
State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, 128 P.3d 1171 ...................................................................................... 5 
Statutes 
Utah Code§ 38-12-103 ....................................................................................................................... 9 
Utah Code§ 38-1-7 ............................................................................................................................. 8 
Utah Code§ 38-la-502 ....................................................................................................................... 8 
Utah Code § 38-2'.'" 7 ................................................................................................................... passim 
Other Authorities 
Court of Appeals Published Decisions By Date - 2015 ................................................................ 7 
H.B. 131, 2012 General Session (Utah) ............................................................................................ 8 
Supreme Court Opinions By Date - 2015 ..................................................................................... 13 
Rules 
Utah R. App. P. 24 ....................................................................................................................... 7, 13 
Utah R. Civ. P. 8 ................................................................................................................................ 10 
111 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INTRODUCTION 
Cross-Appellants (Appellees), including Steve S. Christensen (Christensen), by and 
through counsel, hereby submit this brief supporting their arguments in their initial brief 
(Appellee Brief) and replying to the arguments presented by Cross-Appellee Charles C. Rehn 
(Rehn) in his Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee (Rehn Brief). Appellees 
argue that the slander of title judgment entered against them below was improper because 1) 
Appellees held a valid lien against the property in question (the Property), 2) Rehn failed to 
present evidence of malice, or 3) the jury awarded damages that were per se ineligible for 
award in slander of title actions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. REHN HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT APPELLEES' KNEW 
THEIR CLAIM THAT ALIEN EXISTED WAS FALSE. 
Utah allows establishment of malice by implication, but even where malice is implied, 
the plaintiff must demonstrate "the defendant had actual knowledge that the statements at issue 
were false." Dillon v. S. Mgmt. Corp. Retirement Trust, 2014 UT 14, iJ 35,326 P.3d 656 
(emphasis added). In this case, the relevant statement made by Appellees in their lien against 
Rehn's property is that they held a lien against Rehn's property. Rehn points to no evidence 
that Appellees knew they had no lien whatsoever against Rehn. There was no such evidence 
presented at trial. 
Rehn's ''evidence" that purportedly establishes Christensen knew Appellees' claim to 
a lien was false is problematic in two respects. Rehn Brief, p. 37. 
First, the evidence Rehn invokes relates to Christensen's statements about whether he 
would release the lien after the lien was filed. What Christensen represented about his intent 
1 
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to maintain the lien does not establish that Christensen had actual knowledge that Appellees 
held no right to lien Rehn's property. Christensen established that he believed he had not 
only a consensual lien but also a statutory lien. The lien was recorded and properly identified 
Rehn's property. Christensen specifically called Rehn's attention to the lien in a letter to 
Rehn. This was done in the context of a discussion of the options for payment of the 
outstanding fees. The recorded lien and Christensen's letter provided sufficient notice of the 
lien's existence. Even if Christensen's informal written notice dissembled about the purpose 
or nature of the lien, such actions do not establish that Christensen knew Appellees held no 
right to a lien. For over a decade, Rehn failed to pay off his attorneys fees. Further, for a 
decade after written notice of the lien, Rehn did not challenge the lien or ask that it be 
removed. 
Second, Rehn's conclusory arguments that Christensen knew Appellees had no lien 
are not supported by evidence and are unwarranted under the cited record materials. For 
example, Rehn argues Christensen falsified the lien notice "to make it appear like an 
amendment to an earlier recorded attorney's line [sic] that never existed[.]" Rehn Brief, p. 37. 
Admittedly, Rehn established that there were errors in the lien notice, but the mistakes are 
scrivener's errors that do not affect the right to a lien. There is no admission whatsoever that 
Christensen knew that he had no right to a lien. To the contrary, Christensen testified that 
Rehn agreed in a written, signed engagement letter to a lien on his residence as security for 
Rehn's payment of attorney fees on appeal. Rehn's argument that Christensen made a 
"decision to withhold notice of the Lien from Rehn" is not in evidence. Christensen's letter 
to Rehn gave explicit notice of the lien. Even if the letter was "dissembling about the 
2 
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purpose of the Lien" there is no evidence or admission that Christensen had actual 
knowledge that he had no right to a lien on Rehn's property. 
Rehn criticizes Appellees' reliance on Dillon v. S. Mgmt., Corp. R.eti.rement Trust, 2014 
UT 14. 326 P.3d 656, and First Sec. Bank v. Banbeny Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989). See 
Rehn Brief, p. 38. Contrary to Rehn's implication, the fact that Dillon "merely restate[s] prior 
opinions" makes it no less valuable or authoritative-particularly because it is a recent 
decision of the Utah Supreme Court. Regardless of what Dillon and Banbeny Crossing state 
about implying malice (as opposed to demonstrating actual malice), there remains the fact 
that in proving either implied or actual malice in a slander of title action, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate "the defendant had actual knowledge that the statements at issue were false." 
Dillon v. S. Mgmt. Corp. Retirement Trust, 2014 UT 14,135. Rehn has not produced evidence 
that at any time prior to summary judgment below that Appellees had actual knowledge that 
they held no right to a lien whatsoever against Rehn. Rehn has thus not produced evidence 
sufficient to support a verdict or finding of malice. Therefore, the decision below should be 
reversed in its entirety. 
II. NOTWITHSTANDING REHN'S ARGUMENTS, THE SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLEES WAS IMPROPER. 
Appellees held both an attorney's lien and a consensual lien. Despite errors in the 
notice of lien filed with the county recorder, the right to liens existed independent of any 
notice thereof. Their priority in relation to more properly recorded liens may have been 
questionable because notice of an attorney's lien is tied to priority. See Utah Code § 38-2-
7(9). However, the lien's existence is another matter because an attorney's lien is not created 
or kept alive by notice. See generalfy id 
3 
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A. Appellees held an attorney's lien. 
"An attorney shall have a lien for the balance of compensation due from a client on 
any money or property owned by the client that is the subject of or connected with work 
performed for the client .... " Utah Code § 38-2-7 (2). 
1. Obtaining ownership of proper!)! after representation ends does not shield it from an 
attorney's lien if it was the subject of or connected with the representation. 
Nowhere does the statute limit attorney's liens to property owned by the client at the 
time of the representation or specifically mentioned in a court document. It limits attorney's 
liens to property that was the subject of or connected with the representation and that is 
owned by the client. Holding otherwise would limit attorneys from possessing liens on 
properties owned by the client that the client would not have obtained but for the attorney's 
rep re sen ta tion. 
In this case, Rehn, at a certain point of time, both owned the property and owed 
Appellees for past representation connected to the property. By operation of law, Appellees 
held an attorney's lien on the property, and Appellees recorded an admittedly imperfect 
notice thereof. 
2. The Properry was the marital properry and was connected to Chnstensen's 
representation of &hn. 
As described in more detail infra, Rehn testified that "we moved into that when I was 
still married ... like '94 or something like that." R3945:38. Rehn's assertions on appeal to the 
contrary are thus debunked and the Lindell Affidavit stands discredited by a more 
authoritative source-Rehn himself. Christensen claimed to have advised Rehn regarding the 
Property in the specific context of the divorce. In the summary judgment context, assertions 
4 
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advanced by the non-moving party (Appellees) are entitled to be viewed in a more favorable 
light. 
Admittedly, Appellees did not emphasize the marital home connection below. But, 
Appellees did argue that the Property was connected to the divorce representation and did 
note that Rehn had leased the Property during the marriage in addition to asserting that 
Rehn had sought advice regarding his purchase of the property in connection with the 
divorce representation. R702. The requirement for issue preservation is just that-it requires 
that issues be preserved. State v. Win.field, 2006 UT 4, iJ 14, 128 P.3d 1171. There is no 
requirement that citations, specific arguments, and emphases be preserved. See id. Were it so, 
parties on appeal would be limited to copying and pasting the texts of their arguments into 
their appellate briefs. 
In this case, Appellees argued that the Property was connected to Christensen's 
representation of Relui, highlighting the advice Christensen gave Rehn regarding the 
property mid-divorce and mentioning that Rehn leased the property during the marriage. 
R702. 
3. Contrary to R.ehn's argument, Bay Harbor Farm, LC v. Sumsion is 
instructive. R.ehn 's proposed alternate, CFD Payson, LLC v. Christensen is 
inapposite. 
Appellees invoked Sumsion in the Appellee Brief to emphasize that there need only be 
a connection between the representation and the property to justify an attorney's lien under 
the attorney lien statute. The district court employed an extremely narrow view, requiring the 
Property to be the actual subject of representation. R1957. In Sumsion, this Court explained 
"the statute includes the phrase 'connected with' in addition to the phrase 'the subject of,' 
5 
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indicating that the statute was meant to cover more than those cases where the land is the 
actual subject of the lawsuit." Bery Harbor Farm, LC. v. Sumsion, 2014 UT App 133, ,I 15,329 
P.3d 46. Hence, an attorney may hold a lien on property that was never the subject of the 
representation, addressed or court documents, or mentioned at hearings. Sumsion also states 
that it would be plausible to hold that the land on which a worker's compensation incident 
occurred is connected to representation in the subsequent worker's compensation matter. 
In this case, not only did Rehn consult Christensen regarding potential ownership of 
the Property, it was property that was rented by the parties during the marriage and at which 
marital and family activities occurred. The property was integral to the divorce 
representation since Rehn's alimony was determined in part based on what he could afford 
after his personal expenses. Those expenses included the marital home payments, upkeep 
and utilities. In addition, the location of the home in relation to the children's school and the 
stability it provided would also have been litigated in relation to Rehn's claim for joint 
custody. The consultation and status of the Property as marital home creates both an 
instance where it was the subject of some portion of the representation and connected to the 
rest. 
Rehn attempts to bar Appellees' citation to Sumsion by invoking what might be best 
described as an ill-defined and heretofore unheard of doctrine of citation preservation. 
Sumsion, decided June 12, 2014, was not available to Appellees when they argued at the 
summary judgment hearing six months prior on January 9, 2014. See Sumsion, 2014 UT App 
133; R1956. Notwithstanding, Appellees are entitled to invoke Sumsion to argue that the 
district court's January 2014 decision was incorrect so long as they argued against the 
6 
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decision in the first place. Indeed, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 240), Appellees are entitled 
to notify this Court of controlling authorities not cited to at trial, in appeal briefing, or even 
oral argument. 
Rehn further argues that Appellees' reliance on Sumsion is misplaced. Rehn Brief, 
p. 28. Admittedly, because Sumsion is addressing the Wrongful Lien Act, it is not strictly on 
point. But, the portions on which Appellees rely address the meaning of Utah's attorney lien 
statute. Sumsion, 2014 UT App 133, if 15. Sumsion's comments on Utah Code§ 38-2-7 are 
thus instructive and relevant. 
Rehn directs this Court's attention away from Sumsion and toward CFD Pqyson, ILC 
v. Christensen, 2015 UT App 251, 361 P.3d 145. CFD Pqyson is inapposite.1 It does not 
purport to interpret the attorney lien statute, establish what type of connection is sufficient 
to create an attorney's lien, or speak to whether a client subjected to an attorney's lien must 
own the property during the actual representation (as opposed to owning later). It merely 
concludes that the fact the property in question was owned by a holding LLC means Kim 
Dahl did not own the property, despite being awarded an interest in the liquidation of the 
property investment. CFD Pqyson, 2015 UT App 251, ,r 11. In Rehn's case, it is undisputed 
that he owned the property when Appellees recorded the lien notice and at times when he 
had failed to pay his bill for Christensen's representation of him in the divorce. 
1 CFD Pqyson does not provide controlling legal authority. Further it would be inappropriate 
for Rehn to rely on the facts of CFD Pqyson for as a factual basis in support of Rehn's 
arguments. 1bis Court issued its opinion in CFD Pqyson on October 8, 2015, long after the 
district court had made its final and dispositive judgments/ orders in this case. See Court of 
Appeals Published Decisions By Date - 2015, available at 
https://www.utcourts.gov/ opinions/ appopin/index-2015.asp. 
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4. An attornry 's lien exists independent of the mistakes in the document giving notice 
of the lien. 
Regardless of whether attorneys give notice of their liens, they hold their liens 
beginning with the time of their engagement by the client. Utah Code § 38-2-7 (2)-(3). 
Whether attorneys give notice of their liens or attempt to enforce them is a separate matter. 
See generalfy Utah Code § 38-2-7 (setting forth conditions for existence and commencement 
of attorney's lien in subsections separate from provisions regarding notice and enforcement, 
and not making notice mandatory). Rehn states a lien claimant cannot acquire a lien without 
complying with the statutory provisions. Rehn Brief, p. 30. This is true, but as explained 
supra, hiring the attorney creates the attorney's lien, not the attorney giving notice of the lien. 
Rehn cites First Sec. Mtg. Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919 (Utah 1981) for the proposition 
that without sufficient verification on the lien notice, no lien is created. Rehn then argues 
that Appellees' lien notice lacked proper verification and that the underlying attorney's lien 
was thus invalidated. However, Hansen was addressing Utah Code § 38-1-7, a long 
superseded version of the mechanic's lien statute. Indeed,§ 38-1-7 is now§ 38-la-502.2 Both 
now and in 1981, when Hansen was decided, a person wishing to claim a mechanic's lien (or 
construction lien, as they are now called) was required to file notice. See Utah Code§ 38-la-
502; Hansen, 631 P.2d at 920. If the notice for a construction lien is defective, it appears that 
the lien cannot exist because without notice, there can be no lien. But, in this case, 
Appellees' lien was an attorney's lien, which exists regardless of whether notice is filed with 
2 H.B. 131, 2012 General Session (Utah), available at 
http://le.utah.gov/ ---2012/bills/ static/HB0131.html. 
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the county recorder. Thus, Rehn's arguments that "lien verification" and other notice 
requirements are essential is incorrect. 
5. Concluding that an attornry 1 lien exists regardless of eTTors in the notice thereof 
does not render the notice portions of the attorney's lien statute meaningless. 
Despite Rehn's arguments, there is no provision of the attorney's lien statute that 
renders an attorney's lien void or otherwise prescribes a penalty for failure to follow the 
notice requirements. Rehn seems to be arguing that if an attorney's lien is not invalidated for 
failure to follow the notice requirements, the notice requirements are superfluous. However, 
there is a built-in penalty for failure to observe the attorney lien statute's notice 
requirements. Depending on the defects in notice, the consequence for an improper notice is 
a loss of priority-not invalidation of the lien-because priority is tied to the lien notice 
being filed with the county recorder. See Utah Code§ 38-2-7(9).3 Thus, the notice 
requirements are not superfluous, and this Court need not imagine and enforce penalties that 
are not explicitly prescribed. However, whether the lien notice requirements were met, 
Appellees were entitled to a lien. Assertion of the lien did not slander title. 
It is arguable whether Utah Code§ 38-12-103 applies to the attorney's lien statute, 
but it is at least instructive to note that in prescribing a penalty for failure to give notice of a 
lien,§ 38-12-103(3) expressly provides that failure to give notice does not "invalidate any lien." 
Rehn refuses to admit that § 38-12-103 is either controlling or instructive when 
analyzing the attorney's lien statute. He argues that§ 38-12-103 and the attorney's lien 
statute (§ 38-2-7) are only in the same title and not in the same chapter of the Utah Code. In 
3 Regardless of whether a lien notice is proper, it is enforceable against those who have 
"actual or constructive knowledge of the attorney's lien." Utah Code§ 38-2-7(8). 
9 
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this case, that argument is a poor one. Title 38 of the Utah Code has fifteen chapters, many 
of which embrace a particular type of lien or serve as the umbrella for multiple lien types. 
Chapter 12 especially addresses "Notice of Lien Filing." Therein,§ 102(3) lists chapters of 
title 38 to which it does not apply. The implication is that chapter 12 applies especially to 
some of its fellow chapters and is at least relevant to others, even if they are only in the same 
title of the Utah Code. 
B. Appellees held a consensual lien. 
Appellees admitted there was no written agreement between SSC ( one of multiple 
Appellees) and Rehn. They did not admit that there was no agreement between Rehn and 
the firm Henriod, Nielsen & Christensen. R18, R324. The allegation they were answering 
asserted only that there was no agreement between Rehn and SSC. Id. Moreover, Appellees 
asserted the existence of a consensual lien in their counterclaim. R328. 
Rehn argues that Appellees must present case law to establish that admissions in an 
answer apply only to the allegations in the complaint. Rehn is wrong. It should be him, not 
Appellees, who must produce authority to demonstrate the veracity of the extraordinary 
theory that contents of an answer are binding judicial admissions beyond what the complaint 
asserted. The rule governing pleadings revolves around admitting "the statements in the 
claim" and various degrees of denial. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(b). Nowhere does the rule talk about 
a defendant being able to admit to more than has been alleged in the complaint. Nor has 
Rehn cited any authority justifying a result. Pleadings are to "be construed to do substantial 
justice." U.R.C.P. 8(£). Allowing a plaintiff and trial court to seize upon a partial admission to 
an allegation as being a judicial admission to facts extending far beyond the complaint's 
IO 
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allegations is not substantially just-particularly when a counterclaim in the same document 
affirmatively asserts the existence of a consensual lien. 
Also, as previously argued herein, Rehn mischaracterizes Appellees' decision to 
withdraw the motion to amend the pleadings as a confirmation of the so-called judicial 
admission that Appellees held no contractual lien. But, in withdrawing the motion, Appellees 
stated that they had "located a signed agreement between HNC and Rehn authorizing the 
lien" and that it was not an agreement between "SSC and Rehn, as was the subject of the 
allegation in the Verified Complaint." R1950. Thus, Appellees were proceeding under the 
same theory they now press on appeal-the judicial admission was in regard to signed 
agreements between Rehn and one defendant/appellee. The admission did not reach all 
defendants/ appellees. 
In the Rehn Brief at page 35, Rehn states as follows: "In the Engagement Letter, 
Christensen stated that his right to an attorney's lien was 'as permitted by the laws of the 
State of Utah.' R. 1134." This statement is not a fair representation of the excerpt Rehn is 
quoting. In reality, the language of the "Engagement Letter" does not even refer to an 
"attorney's lien." It refers to "a lien." The letter states "[HNC] shall be entitled to a lien for 
services rendered ... as permitted [sic] the laws of the State of Utah ... " R1134.4 The 
Engagement Letter was stating that HNC had a lien, so long as it was legal in Utah. 
4 The sic is placed to note that the word by is missing in the original. 
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C. Rehn's argument that there is no harmful error in the district court's summary: 
judgment ruling is incorrect. 
Rehn attempts to portray the jury's verdict on the malice element of slander of title 
and the lien notice errors as independent vindication of any error in the district court's 
summary judgment ruling. Rehn's argument is untenable. 
At the beginning of the trial, the district court specifically instructed the jury that the 
Court had already ruled that there were no liens. R3944:115-16. Thus, any finding 
whatsoever the jury made was tainted by the district court's summary judgment ruling. Had 
the district court not entered summary judgment on the first two elements of slander of title, 
Appellees would have been able to show evidence of the existence of a lien. Further, the 
conclusion the court imposed on the jury that there was no lien tainted the inquiry of 
whether there was a right to a lien. As to the establishment of error in the lien, it has been 
argued here on appeal that those errors did not invalidate the lien and do not establish 
slander of title. 
The district court's summary judgment ruling was erroneous. Undoubtedly, an 
erroneous summary judgment ruling such as the one in this case constitutes harmful error. If 
the decision on summary judgment is reversed, this case should be remanded for further 
proceedings. 
III. NO AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE (OR LACK OF OPPOSING EVIDENCE) 
CAN JUSTIFY THE AWARD OF DAMAGES THAT ARE PER SE 
INELIGIBLE FOR AWARD. 
In their initial brief, Appellees invoked case law and analysis to argue that some of the 
damages awarded Rehn for attorney fees were per se unreasonable and unnecessary and thus 
ineligible for award in a slander of title action, not the least of which were fees incurred to 
12 
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pursue the slander of title tort action (in violation of the American Rule) and fees that were 
otherwise unallocated. See general!J Appellee Brief, pp. 35-43. 
Rehn, in an apparent attempt to sway this Court through prejudice, references Dahl v. 
Dahl, 2015 UT 23, ,r,r 175-211,5 another case Christensen handled. Dahl is unrelated to this 
case, particularly because it was not raised or argued below.6 The fact that the Utah Supreme 
Court chastised Christensen for unreasonable fees has no bearing whatsoever on whether 
the jury's damages award in Rehn's favor was legal or appropriate. If Rehn's intent by this 
reference is to distract, confuse, and prejudice this Court, he has violated the rule against 
placing "irrelevant, immaterial, or scandalous matters" in appellate briefs. Utah R. App. P. 
24(k). 
Rehn argues that he presented evidence on the issue of damages, but points to 
nothing that counters Appellees' argument that some damages the jury awarded were per se 
ineligible for award in a slander of title case because the fees were for unrelated or 
unsuccessful endeavors. Indeed, Rehn does not respond to Christensen's argument that 
some of the fees the jury awarded him as damages were ineligible, as a matter of law, to 
remedy a disparagement of title. 
s Rehn Brief, p. 39. 
6 Dahl is not being cited as controlling authority, but rather as a factual basis in support of 
Rehn's arguments. Facts related to Dahl have not been developed on the record. Nor could 
Dahl have been developed on the record or had any effect on the judgment below. The Dahl 
opinion was issued on January 30, 2015, subsequent to entry of final judgment and denial of 
Rehn's motion for attorney fees. See Supreme Court Opinions By Date -2015, available at 
https://www.utcourts.gov/ opinions/ supopin/index-2015.asp. Appellate courts are to 
render opinions based on a review of what was before the trial court. "Appellate jurisdiction 
is the jurisdiction to review the decision or judgment of an inferior tribunal, upon the record 
made in that tribunal, and to affirm, reverse or modify such decision; judgment, or decree." 
State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1941). 
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The district court should have granted Appellees' motion for JNOV or a new trial to 
correct the award of ineligible damages. 
IV. DESPITE REHN'S ASSERTIONS TO THE CONTRARY, APPELLEES 
HAVE PHRASED ISSUES APPROPRIATELY AND INVOKED CORRECT 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW. 
Appellees' Issue 1: 
Appellees' phrasing of Issue 1, as contained in the Appellee Brief is appropriate. 
Appellees have contended that the district court erred by concluding that Rehn had 
made a shoW111g sufficient to satisfy the first two elements of slander of title (publication of a 
false statement slandering title)7 on summary judgment. Regardless of errors contained in the 
notice of lien, there existed an attorney's lien (because of the connection between the 
divorce litigation and the property in question) and a consensual lien. 
Appellees' phrasing of the issue is the most appropriate because it focuses on 
whether either an attorney's lien or consensual lien existed and fairly includes the relevant 
sub-issues. Rehn's phrasing fails to encompass even his own contentions on this issue. 
Rehn admits that Appellees have asserted a connection between Appellees' lien and 
the Property, referring to it as the "sole possible connection." Rehn Brief, p. 1. Appellees 
have contended that the consultation addressing Rehn's intent to purchase the property, 
augmented by the overall circumstances (1ncluding the Property being the marital home, 
including the costs of maintaining the home in determining Rehn's ability to pay alimony 
and the stability of the home location for joint custody), was a connection sufficient to create 
a right to an attorney's lien. The existence of a valid attorney's lien would undermine Rehn's 
7 Dillon v. S. Mgmt Co,p. Retirement Trust, 2014 UT 14, ,r 36,326 P.3d 656. 
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position and the district court's decision. Even if Christensen was wrong about whether the 
consultation about the purchase of the property and litigation over the effect of the home on 
alimony and custody determinations, there was no evidence that Christensen did not believe 
the home related to the litigation. 
Further, Appellees deny that they judicially admitted that no consensual lien existed. 
In the complaint, Rehn asserted no consensual lien existed because there was no signed 
agreement between Rehn and SSC, one of multiple defendants. R18. Appellees admitted that 
there was no signed agreement between Rehn and SSC and denied all else, including the 
assertion that no consensual lien existed. R324. Rehn wishes to interpret that admission as 
reaching beyond the scope of the allegation in the complaint and applying to all 
defendants/appellees, and not just SSC. Appellees assert that doing so is contrary to the 
plain meaning of the admission. Christensen can only admit the exact language of the 
request. Further, admission of no written contract between SSC and Rehn does not logically 
require the admission that there was not a contract between Rehn and Henriod, Nielsen & 
Christensen, as the firm and SSC were different legal entities. Rehn's construction is also 
contradicted by Appellees assertion of the existence of a consensual lien in the counterclaim 
submitted in the same document as the referenced answer. R328. 
Standard of Review: Appellees' statement of the standard of review is correct-and 
complete. Contrary to Rehn's assertion, Appellees did not ignore the "material fact" portion 
of the standard of review for summary judgment. See Appellee Brief, p. 1. 
Appellees' Issue 2: 
Appellees' phrasing of Issue 2 is appropriate, and the issue is preserved. 
15 
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Appellees have argued that there was no evidence of malice, and that absent malice, 
the slander of title judgment cannot stand. Rehn has demonstrated errors on Christensen's 
part and vehemently argued that those errors prove a nefarious motive. But, not all errors 
count as malice in slander of title act.ions. 
A slander of title plaintiff must demonstrate "the defendant had actual knowledge 
that the statements at issue were false." Dillon v. S. Mgmt. Corp. Retirement Trust, 2014 UT 14, 
,I 35, 326 P.3d 656 (emphasis added). Any mistake will not qualify as a false statement 
sufficient to establish malice. Rather, Appellants must establish that Appellees had actual 
knowledge that the assertion of a lien was false at the time they recorded the lien against 
Rehn's property. Proving any other statement or fact is false would not create slander of 
title. Rehn has been focusing on any statement in the notice of lien that happened to be false. 
Under Rehn's proposed phrasing of the issue, proof that Appellees made a false but 
unquestionably irrelevant statement in the lien notice would result in a determination of 
malice, even if the lien existed and was enforceable. If Christensen did not have actual 
knowledge that Appellees were not entitled to a lien at the time it was asserted, he could not 
have had malice. An erroneous labeling of the lien as "amended" or other typographical 
errors do not make the lien more or less valid. Thus, whether Appellees knew their liens 
were unenforceable is essential to establishing malice. 
As to preservation and invited error, it is clear from the record that Appellees' 
counsel was arguing the malice issue, saying that Rehn had failed to demonstrate that 
Appellees knew their claim to a lien was false, or unenforceable. R3945:123-24. Rehn 
responded. Id. Appellees' failure to provide reply or rebuttal does not represent invited error. 
16 
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Appellees moved for a directed verdict. Id Appellees provided argument therefor, and the 
district court ruled thereon. Id. 
Standard of Review: Yet again, Rehn falsely accuses Appellees of misstating the 
standard of review. Rehn's excerpt from State v. Hawkins is merely describing the same 
standard of review that Appellees had already invoked in their statement of the issues. The 
excerpt on which Rehn relies is not a standard of review in and of itself. Reference to the 
portion of the Hawkins paragraph that Rehn failed to quote makes this readily apparent. 
Compare Appellee Brief, p. 2 (setting forth standard of review for Issue 2) with State v. 
Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, ,r 32. 
Appellees' Issue 3: 
Appellees' phrasing of Issue 3 is appropriate and encompasses the specific facet of 
damage awards in slander of title cases that Appellees have put at issue in their cross-appeal. 
In proposing an alternate phrasing of Appellees' third issue, Rehn fails to account for 
Appellees' argument being that some of the attorney fees the jury awarded as damages to 
Rehn are per se ineligible to be awarded as damages in a slander of title action. Indeed, Rehn 
provides no counterargument on the issue of whether some of the attorney fees the jury 
awarded him were per se ineligible. 
Instead, Rehn focuses on the fact that Appellees relied on cross-examination instead 
of presenting their own witness in regard to reasonableness of attorney fees. But, no amount 
of testimony or evidence can justify the award of attorney fees that are per se ineligible for 
award as damages in a slander of title judgment. That some fees are ineligible to be awarded 
as damages, despite testimony to the contrary, accords with the American Rule, followed in 
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Utah, that each party in a tort case is responsible for their own fees. See Ne.ff v. Neff, 2011 UT 
6, ,r 77, 247 P.3d 380; accord Colquhoun v. Webber, 684 A.2d 405,413 (M:e. 1996) (explicitly 
holding that attorney fees to pursue slander of title are not reasonably necessary to remedy a 
disparagement of title and that awarding them would violate the American Rule). 
Admittedly, the American Rule can be confusing .in the context of slander of title. 
Attorney fees are often the damages in slander of title if incurred to remove the 
disparagement of title. But, Neff and Colquhoun explain that those attorney fees, as damages, 
are not the same as the attorney fees incurred to pursue the slander of title action itself. 
Standard of Review: For the third time, Rehn has falsely accused Appellees of 
misstating a standard of review. The quotations Rehn emphasizes do not refute the standard 
of review invoked by Appellees. Rather, they reinforce the standard of review and provide 
commentary thereon. See ASC Utah, Im: v. Wo!f Mountain Resorls, LC, 2013 UT 24, ,r,r 18, 
21-22; Appellee Brief, p. 3. 
V. REHN'S BRIEF MISCHARACTERIZES FACTS. IT ALSO 
MISCHARACTERIZES APPELLEES' PRESENTATION OF THE FACTS. 
A. The Property: was~ indeed~ the marital home~ and Rehn consulted Christensen 
in regard thereto. 
In their initial brief, Appellees contended that the Property was the marital home and 
that this fact strengthened Appellees' claims that the Property was connected to 
Christensen's representation of Rehn ID the divorce and divorce appeal. Appellee Brief, 
pp. 21-22. 
In his brief, Rehn shot back, asserting that Appellees' statement was "extremely 
misrepresentative" and referencing the marital home assertion as a "glaring example." Rehn 
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Brief, p. 7. In the Rehn Brief, Rehn explains that he did not begin living at the Property until 
July 1997, six weeks before the divorce trial, and to support this assertion, referenced an 
affidavit signed by Bruce Lindell. Id. 
However~ Rehn's testimony at the trial below flatly contradicts the assertions in his 
appeal brief and further calls into doubt the veracity Lindell's affidavit. At trial, Rehn took 
the witness stand, and, in response to a question asking when he moved into the Property, 
stated as follows: 
Boy, we moved into that when I was still married, so this-the property on 
Saddleback that-I think we moved in there like '94 or something like that. I 
can't remember offhand. 
R3945:38. 
Rehn's attempts to discredit Christensen's claim that he and Rehn discussed the 
potential purchase of the Property during Christensen's representation of Rehn in the 
divorce should also be disregarded. Rehn highlights that Christensen admitted at trial to not 
remembering the date or ti.me the conversation took place. However, it should be noted that 
the conversation and the trial at which the conversation was discussed would have taken 
place approximately twenty years apart. In the absence of a written record detailing the 
content of what would have been one of many conversations over a long period of time 
between Rehn and Christensen, it should be understandable that Christensen would not 
recall the date and time of the conversation after that long passage of time. 
B. Appellees held a contractual lien. 
As alleged in the pleadings and argued in the Appellee Brief, Appellees held a 
contractual lien. The district's court's decision to construe Appellees' answer as a judicial 
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admission that no contractual lien existed was inappropriate when the specific statement that 
was admitted was much narrower than the district court interpreted it. The absence of a 
written agreement between Rehn and SSC was appropriately admitted. However, Appellees 
were not asked to deny a written agreement between Rehn and Hentiod, Nielsen & 
Christensen, yet the district court imposed such an admission on Appellees. 
Rehn mischaracterizes Appellees' decision to withdraw the motion to amend the 
pleadings as a confirmation of the so-called judicial admission that Appellees held no 
contractual lien. In withdrawing the motion, Appellees stated that they had "located a signed 
agreement between HNC and Rehn authorizing the lien" and that it was not an agreement 
between "SSC and Rehn, as was the subject of the allegation in the Verified Complaint." 
R1950. Thus, Appellees were proceeding under the same theory they now press on appeal-
the judicial admission was in regard to signed agreements between Rehn and one 
defendant/ appellee, but not the others. The district court and Rehn improperly interpreted 
the admission as reaching all defendants/ appellees. 
C. The difference between Appellees' version of the facts and Rehn's version of 
the facts is caused by differing perspectives and interpretations. 
With the more notable exception of Rehn claiming in his appeal brief that he did not 
move into the Property until 1997 despite testifying below that he began living there in 1994, 
the differing views on the facts can be largely attributed to perspective and interpretation. 
Some of those perspectives and interpretations relate to the procedural posture of how facts 
are to be considered or their actual implication in context of the case. For example, 
Appellees drafted their factual statement keeping in mind that in making summary judgment 
decisions, courts are to view facts and reasonable inferences "in the light most favorable to 
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the nonmoving party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ~ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (quoting another 
source). Where the standard of review was less favorable to Appellees, Appellees marshalled 
evidence and did so in close proximity to the point in the Appellee Brief where those 
arguments were presented. See Appellee Brief, pp. 29, 40. 
It should be noted that Rehn's version of the facts is littered with factual statements 
anchored to asswnptions that are not grounded in objective evidence or findings of fact. 
These statements that Rehn has strewn about are assumptions and interpretations based not 
on actual findings of fact, but on Rehn's naked allegations and theories. For example, Rehn 
states that if Christensen had cited the correct statute in the lien notice "it would have belied 
his attempt to make the Lien appear to relate back in time." Rehn Brief, p. 10. Or-"The 
only explanation for these falsifications was to make SSC's lien rights facially appear to relate 
back to 1995."8 Id. at p. 11. Another: "[Christensen] belatedly tried to cover himself when he 
learned that Rehn would likely discover the Lien." Id. at p. 12. None of these facts establish 
that Appellees knew at the time of recording that they had no right to a lien. 
In reality, the actual findings the district court made are few in number. In the 
summary judgment order, there are only seven. R1957. The jury verdict addressed no more 
than three questions. R3617. There were also some findings in the district court's order 
denying Rehn's motion for attorney fees. R3 721-24. 
8 Appellees have, in fact, provided an explanation. It is alleged that Christensen used a 
template to draft the notice. Appellee Brief, p. 9. Since the statute had changed only a few 
months prior to Christensen using the template, the explanation is reasonable. See id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellees' phrasing of the issues, as presented in their initial brief is appropriate. The 
standards of review invoked are correct. Further, in light of Rehn's own testimony at the trial 
below, Rehn's argument on appeal that the Property was not the marital home stands 
debunked. 
The mere fact that a property was bought after a representation does not necessarily 
shield it from an attorney's lien, particularly if it was the subject of or connected to the 
representation as was the case, here. Mistakes in notices of lien do not invalidate a lien that 
exists regardless of whether notice is filed with the county recorder. 
Moreover, Rehn failed to meet the requirement of making a showing that Appellees 
actually knew they held no lien or establishing that all of the damages awarded him were 
even eligible to be awarded in a slander of title action. 
WHEREFORE, Appellees request that this Court reverse the district court's slander 
of title judgment and order that this case be dismissed with prejudice. Alternatively, if the 
Court concludes that dismissing the slander of title judgment is inappropriate, Appellees' 
request that this case be remanded to recalculate Rehn's damages or for other appropriate 
reason consistent with Appellees' arguments on appeal. 
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REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appellees respectfully request oral argument. 
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of May. 2016. 
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